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Michels' Law of Oligarchy and
Minnesota Republican Nucleons and Cadres
THOMAS

L.

PAHL*

ABSTRACT - In an attempt to evaluate Michels' assertions about an "iron law of oligarchy,'' the
top two levels of leadership in a state political party have been compared. An attempt to flnd
significant differences which would support Michels' elitist theories has been made by comparing
demographic factors, work approval and disapproval, political factors, and career aspirations of
nucleons and cadres. No great support for the theories has been found, and some contrary evidence has been unearthed. In a further attempt to test Michels' theory, the leadership is divided
along career aspirations into careerists and terminals; the support for an iron law of oligarchy is
even weaker in this comparison.

Implicit in Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" is
the assumption that a handful of individuals will assume
control and power in a political party, that these individ:.
uals will not be typical of the rank and file of the organization, and that others at intermediate levels will desire
elite positions but the elite will perpetuate themselves in
power. (Michels 1962). If these assumptions are correct,
we should find a significant difference in demographic,
economic, political, and social characteristics between the
top and the intermediate levels of party leadership, significant differences between the likes and dislikes of party
organizational tasks, and significant differences between
their activism incentives. Finally we should find a substantial number of the intermediate leadership eager to
hold higher party position.
Dwaine Marvick recently suggested the following distinction between top leadership, called "nucleus" and an
intermediate leadership called "cadre":
Functionally, elites are eternally differentiated. One
can distinguish between the larger group, or "cadre,"
who are typically specialized to implement the specific ends of their organization, and the smaller
group of the leaders, or "nucleus" ...
A cadre is an elite stratum, typically larger than the
elite nucleus, specifically confined to those who are
expected to perform instrumental roles in furthering
the organization's goals. The term "cadre" is further
limited to those who provide the skeleton staff of an
organization, capable of recruiting, training, and organizing additional members. (Marvick 1968: 349350)
A like distinction is made here, with the members of
the Minnesota Republican Executive and Central Committees constituting the "nucleons" and the intermediate
level of leadership - county, legislative district, ward constituting the "cadre."
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In an attempt to relate incentives to organization
theory, Marvick and others (Eldersveld), (Marvick and
Nixon), (Bowman, Ippolito and Donaldson) adopted the
three broad categories of incentives that, according to
Clark and Wilson, influenced members of organizations.
"Solidary" incentives are intangible rewards of a social
nature, "purposive" incentives are intangibles related to
the stated ends of the organization, and "material" incentives are tangible rewards such as money or business
contacts. These categories are used here to study the differences between nucleons and cadres within the hierarchy of a political party.
The data in this study were collected in the spring of
1969 through a mail survey of 258 Republican leaders in
Minnesota. The questionnaire was comprehensive but
brief: two legal size pages with twenty-seven questions.
The questionnaire was supplemented through personal interviews with party staff members, volunteer personnel,
attendance at organizational meetings, and through use of
data from other sources. Party volunteers, especially college summer interns, made possible the coding, key
punching, and data processing. There was a return rate
of 70 per cent on the questionnaires, and the completion
ratio of items was above 90 per cent.
Nucleons, cadres and demography

Implicit in Michels' iron law are differences in demographic, economic, and social characteristics between the
top and intermediate levels of party leadership resulting
from the denial of leadership access to those not congruent with the nucleus. Based on this supposition, we
would expect to find statistically significant differences in
residence, place of birth, income, occupation, age, sex,
nativeness, and education. Application of Chi-Square
tests indicates that only in the cases of residence, place of
birth, and income are the differences between the nucleons
and the cadres statistically significant (the level of significance in this study is .05) . The conclusion is rather
meager: high income leaders who live in the metropolitan
area in which they were born are more likely to be top
party leaders than are lower income, rural born, rural
residents. These are hardly the hard data from which flow
support of Michels' iron law of oligarchy.
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Work approval and disapproval
When asked what they like most about their positions,
a bare majority of Minnesota Republican leaders said
their posts provide personal satisfaction and rewards.
Minnesotans are less inclined to cite reasons of personal
satisfaction than are Massachusetts and North Carolina
Republicans surveyed by the Bowman, Ipolita and Donaldson (BID) study. On the other hand, Minnesotans
are much more likely to like general party activities. Perhaps this is a result of the promotion of voter surveys,
door-to-door small gift solicitation, and get-out-the-vote
drives as "priority activities" by the Minnesota professional field staff (Minnesota Republican Party).
A comparison of Minnesota cadres and nucleons gives
the impression that while differences are not statistically
significant, certain patterns of work approval emerge. As
one moves upward in level of leadership, one looks less
to personal satisfaction and rewards and more to intraparty influence, with usual party activities and community
influence remaining constant in importance. Perhaps the
desire for more influence in party affairs is a motivating
force that drives one to leave the comparatively pedestrian pace of the cadre for the more demanding role of a
nucleon.
Interstate variations occur when the leaders are asked
what they dislike most about their positions. The reaction
against using the political leader in the solicitation of
funds from the public, prevalent among Bay State Republicans, is not repeated in Minnesota. In contrast,
almost 80 per cent of Minnesota Republican leaders work
in door-to-door small gift fund drives. The BID study suggestion that the dislike of party tasks mirrors differing
perceptions of influence in party or community does not
explain the difference here. Although both party groups
have the same degree of perceived influence, Minnesotans
like party tasks and Massachusetts Republicans do not.
Perhaps these gritty party tasks have been rationalized
for Minnesotans in terms of personal satisfactions and
rewards but have not been in the Bay State.
The greatest concern of a majority of Minnesota Republican leaders is the apathy of the people in the community, whereas only a minority of the Massachusetts and
North Carolina leaders· express this as their greatest concern. Party groups in the three states also vary in their
dislikes of non-organizational conflicts; it is a minor problem except in Massachusetts.
Concern over demand on time is uniformly the second
highest dislike for all groups. In Minnesota, when one
moves from the intermediate level to the top level of
political leadership, one is less concerned with the apathy
of party workers and more concerned with conflicts within the party. Perhaps this is explained by the lack of
opportunities to observe the top level conflict until one
becomes a member of the nucleus.
Types of incentives
Republican leaders in Massachusetts, North Carolina,
and Minnesota rank incentives similarly with a high
Spearman coefficient of rank correlation of .94 between
the BID results and the Minnesota results (Table I).
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·There appears to be no interstate difference in ranking of
incentives, ilor are there· great interstate differences in
the ranking of incentive catego1ies (Table II).
Political scif;ntists assume that as a politician moves
from the intermediate level to the top level of leadership,
the more altruistic incentives drop in importance and the
other incentives increase in importance. In the Minnesota
study, the only instance in which this increase is statistically significant is in personal friendship of candidate.
Surprisingly, the percentage of nucleon members who say
that politics is importa~t as a way of life or that making
business contacts is an important incentive is less than the
percent of cadre members who say these are important.
The difference, however, is not statistically significant.
Thus, there seems to be little in the differences between
incentives to support theories based on differentiated
party elites.
The BID study suggested that activists were more highly motivated by concerns about public issues, community
obligation, and party loyalty and social contacts than by
material· gains. They went on to imply that because material rewards would be more available at higher levels,
material incentives would be more important there (Bowman, Ippolito and Donaldson). Our data do not support
this hypothesis, in that little difference is found between
nucleons and cadres in material incentive category grand
mean scores. We suggest that this is due to the lack of
material rewards in the Minnesota political system. Important for this study is the observation that our data give
no indication that desire for material gain distinguishes
the top party leaders from the intermediate leaders.
Therefore our data are of no help to those who would
see differentiated party elites as part of an iron law of
oligarchy.
Nucleons, cadres and politics
In the e:,s:amination of sundry political factors which
distinguish the two levels of Minnesota Republican
leadership some surprising results occur. First, contrary
to McClosky et. al, leaders do not move ideologically
away from followers as they move up in levels of leadership. Based on results of a liberal-conservative semantic
differential, nucleons are less likely to identify themselves
as conservatives than are cadres. Perhaps this can be explained by the tendency for metropolitan areas to be
over-represented among the nucleons in Minnesota Republican politics. This explanation rests, of course, on the
assumption that metropolitan leaders are less conservative than rural leaders.
Secondly, nucleons are more likely to view the governorship as the most important electoral contest, whereas
cadres are more likely to view the United States senator
post as the most important. This seems contrary to the
common sense notion that, as one progresses upward in
party leadership, one's interest moves from local to state
to national contests. Perhaps here the nucleons are more
cognizant of both the success of Minnesota Republicans
at the state level and the importance of the governor's
role in the 1971 legislative session, charged with reapportionment and redistricting. Perhaps the interest of the
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TABLE I. IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES TO
REPUBLICAN LEADERS IN SELECTED STATES (IN PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHQ GAVE THE INCENTIVE THE
HIGHEST POSSIBLE RATING).

N.C.

Avg.

Minnesota Study
NucleAvg.
ons Cadres

91

89

93

92

93

85

85

80

75

84

58

56

57

57

58

57

42

44

43

44

42

45

25

35

30

24

24

24

15

24

19

13

19

9

30

56

43

6

7

5

3

4

5

7

3

20

18

3

5

3

4

2

1

2

BID
Incentives

Mass

Study

Purposive:
1. Concern with

public issues .... 88
2. Sense of community obligation 85 •
Solidary:

3. Strong party
loyalty ........
4. Politics part of
way of life .....
5. Fun and excitement of campaign
6. Personal friend
of candidate ....
7. Making social contacts and friends .

Eighty-three per cent of the Minnesota Republican nucleons would prefer a longer tenure than the present twoyear term, and three-fourths of the cadre express a desire
for a higher position. We also find that 81 per cent of the
cadres also approve of the longer term, and a third of the
nucleons say they wish to terminate their present party
position.
In an attempt to examine career aspirations, all those
who indicate that they do not want another term and also
do not seek a higher position are grouped as "terminals,"
whereas those who intend either to remain in their position or to seek advancement are grouped as "careerists."
An almost even split occurs, with 13 3 careerists and 131
terminals identified. This division squares with recent
results in the Minnesota Republican Party. Reporting a
"healthy" turnover in county chairmen, the party said:
"Fifty per cent turnover is considered to be an excellent ratio since it both provides the continuation
of experienced leadership and adds the stimulus of
new blood and new ideas." (Minnesota Republican
State Central Committee).

Material:

8. Furthering political ambition ... 5
9. Being close to influential people
15
10. Making business
contacts ....... 5
N= ........... (40)

3
(34)

(74) (258) (106) (152)

intermediate level reflects the more glamorous national
office and the heady thought of having a Republican
senator from Minnesota for the first time since 1958.
Thirdly, cadres are more likely to contribute financially to the Minnesota Republican party than are nucleons.
The explanation for this phenomenon escapes us unless
the cadres are more involved than nucleons in finance
drives at the county level.
Finally, when asked the most important reason for
advancement, nucleons are more likely than cadres to
choose ideology. This squares with the previous observation that conflict within the party is more salient to
nucleons than cadres. Apparently, as one moves up 1n
party leadership ideological conflict. gains a more important but less desirable status. Although this and other
political factors differentiate top level leadership from
intermediate level leadership, no pattern of relationship
has developed which could substantiate Michels' iron
law of oligarchy.
Aspirations: Terminals and careerists

Michels' iron law of oligarchy implies that a permanent
top leadership exists which tends to stay in power over
a long period of time, and that this elite fights attempts by
other members to penetrate their group. Michels also
implies that ambitious party members who desire positions of leadership exist, but their attempts to crack the
elite only meet frustration. Thus we would expect to find
nucleons clinging to their positions and cadres anxious
to move up to higher positions. Our findings are mixed.
Journal of, Volume Thirty-seven, Nos. 2 and 3, 1971

This goal of fifty per cent turnover hardly supports
Michels' theory. But is it merely rhetoric? Do significant
differences remain between nucleons and cadres which
would suggest an exclusive leadership at the top level? A
comparison of careerists and terminals may provide an
answer.
· Only three demographic characteristics show a statistically significant difference between Minnesota Republican careerists and terminals: residence, occupation, and
sex. Rural leaders are more likely to be terminals than
metropolitan leaders, housewives are more likely to be
terminals than managers, professionals, white or blue
collar workers, and women are more likely to be terminals
than men. The conclusion that rural housewives are more
likely to consider their party positions temporary than do
metropolitan men hardly challenges the imagination. Nor
does it give much support to any oligarchic theory.
When the BID study contrasted the work approval
ratings of those who said they were going to continue in
· party work with those who planned to quit, little variation occurred (Bowman, Ippolito and Donaldson). Our
comparison of Minnesota Republican careerists' work
approval with terminals' work approval shows that terminals mention personal satisfactions more often than careerists; careerists mention community influence more
often than terminals do. However, the differences are not
statistically significant. The BID study found few substantial differences in terms of work disapproval. Demand on
time constituted a greater burden among careerists than
among terminals. We do not find that to be the case in
Minnesota. The Minnesota Republican careerists and
terminals do not differ in work disapproval items. This
is quite a contrast to the many differences in work disapproval observed between nucleons and cadres.
We share the BID observation that there is no evidence
of a consistent pattern of differentiation between careerists and terminals in the political factors examined.
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TABLE II. IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARY, PURPOSIVE, MATERIAL INCENTIVES TO
REPUBLICAN LEADERS IN SELECTED STATES (IN GRAND MEAN SCORES*)
Category of
Incentive:

N.C.

Purposive ............................... 1.17
Solidary ................................ 2.14
Material ................................ 3.15

BID Study
Mass.

Mean

Mean

Nucleons

1.21
2.15
3.39

1.18
2.01
3.12

1.14
2.05
3.55

1.16
1.99
3.56

Minnesota Study
Careerists
Cadres

1.12
2.09
3.54

1.15
2.22
3.47

Terminals

1.12
1.88
3.63

,:, The higher the grand mean, the lower the incentive category in importance.

Incentives analyzed

In its comparison of careerists and terminals, the BID
study found two cases in the battery of incentive items
in which important variation was shown. These were the
importance of personal friendship for a candidate and
the importance of strong party loyalty. In both cases they
were of greater importance to the careerists than to the
terminals (Bowman, Ippolito and Donaldson). The only
statistical significance we find is in the item covering
fun and excitement of the campaign. The Minnesota
Republican terminals are more likely to mention this item
than are the careerists. Perhaps the terminals enter politics during a campaign and lose interest between elections
when work turns to more mundane party tasks. If that
is the case, we are curious why this is not reflected in
responses to the work disapproval question. We would
expect terminals to express a greater disapproval rating
for party tasks than careerists if terminals are more likely
than careerists to rate fun and excitement of a campaign
as an important incentive. However, they inexplicably do
not.
We then compare the incentive category grand mean
scores of Minnesota careerists and terminals. As in the
BID study, the relative ranking is as follows: purposive
incentives most important, solidary incentives next most
important, material incentives least important (Table II).
We note a slight tendency for terminals to cite purposive
and solidary incentives and a tendency for careerists to
cite material incentives; but the difference hardly warrants a conclusion that material "pay-offs" keep Minnesota Republican leaders active.
Michels' theory implies that one moves up in the party
hierarchy because one has won favor with those in the
exclusive elite. If the decision not to remain active as a
leader is due to lack of one's acceptance by the elite, we
would expect the terminals more than the careerists to
select "it's who you know that counts" as the most important reason for advancement. However, our study fails
to show any tendency for terminals and careerists to differ
in their assessment of reasons for advancement. Furthermore, the differences that we have observed between
nucleons and cadres concerning ideology as an advancement reason disappear when we compare Minnesota terminals and careerists.
Differences not systematic

We reach the conclusion that, althought variations
exist between nucleons and cadres and between careerists
and terminals, they do not constitute a systematic pattern
that would give support to Robert Michel's theory of an
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iron law of oligarchy. The fact that we do not find support
for the theory does not mean that an iron law does not
exist; the possibility that Michels' selection process is already at work when leaders rise to the middle levels of
leadership makes any conclusion of that sort tenuous.
The differences observed among the Republican leaders
in North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Minnesota suggest
that the unique state political pattern within which a
.political party operates may have greater effect on intraelite relationships than heretofore thought. If so, Dwaine
Marvick is correct in his observation that research on
intra-elite relationships is long overdue. Perhaps similar
comparative studies of state party leadership will.provide
better generalizations than Michel's iron law of oligarchy.
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